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INDIVIDUAL VS. COLLECTIVE AGREEMENTS:
A STUDY IN CONFLICT AND UNION LEVERAGE
PETER I. DEKOM*
I. INTRODUCTION
0 UR national labor policy, as evidenced by the National Labor Rela-
tions Acte (NLRA), was carefully molded to protect the working
man from potential exploitation by his employer. To give the individual
worker the power to deal with his industrialist employer from a position
of strength, our labor policy accords such laborers the right to pool their
strength through union organization.' There is no sign in the legislative
history of this act that Congress envisioned a strong union growth among
a class of employees who, sometimes in less than one year, can earn more
than the average worker does in a lifetime.
These people, notably in the entertainment and mass media fields, wield
the bargaining power of their names and expertise. As individuals, they
often have as substantial a bargaining position as an entire union in an-
other area. Yet these big-time union members are grouped with their per-
haps less fortunate compatriots. In the name of concerted activity, they are
required to suspend the fruits of their labors, and the employer is faced
with this extraordinary additional pressure. Perhaps this is justified, at
least where gain is anticipated for the immediate union to which these
entertainers and media personalities belong. However, as the gain to the
immediate union becomes less direct, as in the case of honoring another
union's picket line, the policies underlying such activities should be
re-examined.
This article is directed to a generic examination of the rights a person
might have under an individual agreement, when the agreement is in con-
flict with a collective bargaining agreement applicable to that individual.
Specifically, this article will deal with problems faced in two recent New
York lower court decisions 3 dealing with television network newsmen-
announcers, members of the American Federation of Television and
Radio Artists (AFTRA), who were ordered by their union to honor the
picket lines of another union on strike against the networks. The issues
* Member of the California Bar. Mr. Dekom received his B.A. from Yale University and
his J. D. from U.CL.A.
1. 29 u.s.c. §§ 151-66 (1970).
2. See, e.g., id. § 157.
3. American Broadcasting Co. v. Brandt, 56 Misc. 2d 198, 287 N.Y.S.2d 719 (Sup. Ct.),
aft'd, 30 App. Div. 2d 935, 293 N.Y.S.2d 988 (1st Dep't 1968); Columbia Broadcasting
System, Inc. v. Baldwin, 70 CCH Lab. Cas. U 13,275 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1972).
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range from whether such activities are covered by a no-strike clause to
whether they are enjoinable as an interference with individual contract
rights sanctioned by the union, and to whether such disputes are subject
to arbitration.
In order to deal effectively with this contemporary problem, it is neces-
sary first to examine the historical context of the various doctrines in-
volved; the basic status of individual contracts when in conflict with col-
lective agreements; the right of a union to insist that its membership honor
the picket lines of another union; and the effect of an agreement to arbi-
trate, contained in an expired collective agreement, on the union's insis-
tence that its members honor the picket lines of another union. The issues
are drawn narrowly in order to limit an expansive area of the law, in the
hope of presenting a thorough analysis within a reasonable space.
II. HISTORICAL PRECEDENTS: INDIVIDUAL VS. COLLECTIVE AGREEMENT
A. The Supreme Court
When the Supreme Court sustained the constitutionality of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act,4 there was the suggestion that employers
might be able to circumvent the directives of the national labor policy
by means of individual contracts with their employees.' However, within
two years, indications were that such attempts to avoid the congressional
policy would meet with failure.' In 1944, those indications became law
in 1.1. Case Co. v. NLRB.7
In Case,the employer had requested that his employees voluntarily ac-
cept individual contracts. There was no evidence of coercion or of any
unfair labor practices.8 The employer argued that while these good faith
individual agreements were in effect, any attempt to force him to the col-
lective bargaining table regarding these employees would be an unconsti-
4. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-66 (1970).
5. "The [NLRAI does not compel agreements between employers and employees.... It
does not prevent the employer 'from refusing to make a collective contract and hiring indi-
viduals on whatever terms' the employer 'may by unilateral action determine.'" NLRB v.
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 45 (1937) (footnote omitted).
6. In National Licorice Co. v. NLRB, 309 U.S. 350 (1940), the Supreme Court upheld an
NLRB ban on the employer's giving effect to individual contracts coerced from his em-
ployees during an attempt to unionize. The Court agreed that these contracts "imposed
illegal restraints upon the employees' rights to organize and bargain collectively guaranteed
by §§ 7 and 8 of the [NLRA]." Id. at 360. However, this case dealt exclusively with the
employer who insists on such individual contracts solely for the purpose of frustrating the
national labor policy. Id.
7. 321 U.S. 332 (1944).
8. Unlike National Licorice, this employer did not enter into these individual contracts
to frustrate the national labor policy. Id. at 333.
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tutional impairment of the right of contract. The Court analyzed the
purpose and intent of the NLRA and concluded that these individual
agreements were superseded by the terms of a collective bargaining
agreement negotiated with the properly certified union representative.
After voicing its suspicion of individual advantages, the Court did indi-
cate, however, that it would leave open the question of whether an indi-
vidual employee could avail himself of the more advantageous terms of
his individual agreement.' 0 This issue was not reached because the collec-
9. The Court reasoned: "[Aln employee becomes entitled by virtue of the Labor Rela-
tions Act somewhat as a third party beneficiary to all benefits of the collective trade agree-
ment, even if on his own he would yield to less favorable terms. The individual hiring con-
tract is subsidiary to the terms of the trade agreement and may not waive any of its
benefits, any more than a shipper can contract away the benefit of filed tariffs . .. ." Id.
at 336.
And later: "[But i]ndividual contracts, no matter what the circumstances that justify
their execution or what their terms, may not be availed of to defeat or delay the procedures
prescribed by the National Labor Relations Act . . . to forestall bargaining or to limit or
condition the terms of the collective agreement.... Wherever private contracts conflict with
[the NLRB's] functions, they obviously must yield or the Act would be reduced to a
futility.
"It is equally dear since the collective trade agreement is to serve the purpose con-
templated by the Act, the individual contract cannot be effective as a waiver of any benefit
to which the employee otherwise would be entitled under the trade agreement. The very
purpose of providing by statute for the collective agreement is to supersede the terms of
separate agreements of employees with the terms which reflect the strength and bargaining
power and serve the welfare of the group. Its benefits and advantages are open to every
employee of the represented unit, whatever the type or terms of his pre-existing contract
of employment." Id. at 337-38.
See also Railroad Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 321 US. 342 (1944)
(companion to Case decision). There the Court refused to allow individual contracts even
though voluntary, to supersede the terms of an earlier collective bargaining agreement.
Id. at 347.
10. "But it is urged that some employees may lose by the collective agreement, that
an individual workman may sometimes have, or be capable of getting, better terms than
those obtainable by the group and that his freedom of contract must be respected on that
account. We are not called upon to say that under no circumstances can an individual
enforce an agreement more advantageous than a collective agreement, but we find . . . no
ground for holding generally that individual contracts may survive or surmount collective
ones. The practice and philosophy of collective bargaining looks with suspicion on such
individual advantages. Of course, where there is great variation in circumstances of em-
ployment . . . it is possible for the collective bargain to prescribe only minimum rates or
maximum hours or expressly to leave certain areas open to individual bargaining. But
except as so provided, advantages to individuals may prove as disruptive of industrial peace
as disadvantages [and the benefit of one may hurt the group as a whole]. Individual con-
tracts cannot subtract from collective ones, and whether under some circumstances they
may add to them in matters covered by the collective bargain, we leave to be determined
by appropriate forums under the laws of contracts applicable, and to the Labor Board if
they constitute unfair labor practices.
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tive bargaining agreement at bar was considered far more beneficial than
the individual agreements deemed to be superseded.
It is interesting to note that the Court apparently sanctioned union
approval of certain areas of contract which might be left up to the
independent negotiation between the individual and his employer, not-
withstanding the collective agreement.-' However, there is a strong nega-
tive implication that this is perhaps the only way an individual can ob-
tain better terms than his co-workers without forcing his employer to
commit an unfair labor practice. 2 The Court seems to have sustained this
implication in a later case which banned negotiations between employees
and employer without the inclusion of the certified union.18 There is lit-
tle doubt that this approach has survived intact, if not enhanced, to the
present day.14
"... (where areas are not covered by the collective contract, employees may voluntarily
contract with the employer so long as the latter does not] incidentally exact or obtain any
diminution of his own obligation or any increase [in benefits] of those employees in the
matters covered by collective agreement." 321 U.S. at 338-39.
This same position is stated in Railroad Telegraphers:
"It may be agreed that particular situations are reserved for individual contracting,
either completely or within prescribed limits." 321 U.S. at 347.
The National Labor Relations Board addressed the problem of exactly what a "less
favorable" individual contract term might be. In Midland Broadcasting Co., 93 N.L.R.B.
455 (1951), the Board dealt with a collective agreement between the employer radio
station and the American Federation of Radio Artists (the predecessor of the American
Federation of Television and Radio Artists) which allowed the employer to negotiate with
its on-the-air personalities for individual talent contracts as long as there were no terms
and conditions less favorable than those in the collective agreement. The employer did so
negotiate by adding some benefits (e.g., pay guarantees) while withdrawing others (e.g., the
right to accept other employment). Noting that the net effect of the individual contracts
appeared to be more favorable, the Board refused to remove any negative term:
"It is not sufficient, in our opinion, to show that a particular provision of the talent con-
tracts, taken by itself, is less favorable than a particular term of the union contract." 93
N.L.R.B. at 456. However, the Board also expressed a feeling that this dispute would have
been resolved more effectively through the established grievance procedure. The decision is
quite logical although the language is not so sweeping as the language of Case would lead one
to suspect in terms of response by the Board.
11. See note 10 supra.
12. Id.
13. Medo Photo Supply Corp. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 678, 683-84 (1944). Even where a
majority of the employees in a given bargaining unit no longer wants the union to represent
its interests, until certification is revoked it is an unfair labor practice (refusal to bargain
in good faith under 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (5)) for the employer to engage in individual nego-
tiations with his employees while negotiations with the union are pending. See also NLRB v.
Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 748 n.16 (1962).
14. "The [labor] policy therefore extinguishes the individual employee's power to order his
own relations with his employer and creates a power vested in the chosen representative to
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B. The Response of the Lower Courts
The issue of conflict between a collective and an individual contract
has been raised in both state and federal courts.' The response has been
less than uniform. The obvious result-invalidation of the individual
agreement--certainly has occurred with the greatest frequency in situa-
tions where employers have used the individual contract as an obvious
means of avoiding a collective agreement.
This pure conflict situation, which is a clear attempt to evade the
national labor policy, is reflected in cases like NLRB v. Port Gibson
Veneer & Box Co.,' NLRB v. Valley Broadcasting Co.," and West-
inghouse Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.8 Each of
these federal decisions seems to emphasize the governmental interest in
sacrificing any individual agreements to the collective betterment. This
seems in accord with Case.
However, more interesting approaches seem to have been raised in
act in the interest of all employees.... Thus only the union may contract the employee's
terms and conditions of employment, and provisions for processing his grievances; the union
may even bargain away his right to strike during the contract term, and his right to refuse
to cross a lawful picket line. The employee may disagree with many of the union decisions
but is bound by them." NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 US. 175, 180 (1967) (foot-
notes omitted). These strong words, expressed by Justice Brennan in a narrow 5-4 decision,
suggest that the Case doctrine has survived into the present day with perhaps a stronger
judicial sentiment, at least in the Warren Court, against individual advantages through
individual agreement.
15. See notes 16-44 infra and accompanying text.
16. 167 F.2d 144 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 819 (1948). The court found that the
attempts of a crate manufacturer to get his employees to sign individual contracts, while not
directly opposing unionism and organization, had the effect of deterring union organization
and was thereby an unfair labor practice. Id. at 146.
17. 189 F.2d 582 (6th Cir. 1951). Here, the management of a radio station, knowing that
the American Federation of Radio Artists was trying to organize the station's announcers,
prepared individual contracts with each announcer (even though these announcers had
signed cards naming AFRA as their exclusive bargaining agent). Though these agreements
were never signed, their terms were put into effect, affording the announcers some needed
economic relief. Ultimately, the employees abandoned their plans to unionize the station
and, in effect, went along with the employer who had said the union contained undesirable
communist elements. The court held that the employer had committed an unfair labor prac-
tice by bargaining with his employees without union sanction or control. Id. at 586-87.
18. 210 F.2d 623 (3d Cir. 1954), aff'd, 348 U.S. 437 (1955). Citing Case, the court stated:
"The bargaining representative is made the sole agent for the unit and represents not
only its members but all employees in that unit whether members of the union or not. The
terms of the collective contract thus become part of the individual contract of employment,
not because of consensual acts of the employer and employee, but because the law says so no
matter how those parties may feel about the matter." 210 F.2d at 627 (citation omitted).
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state courts, which often have ignored the dictates, and dicta, of Case.
In Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Durkin,0 the court held simply
that Case did not bar the state from imposing restrictions on the com-
missions which might be charged by insurance salesmen, notwithstanding
a contrary provision in the salesmen's collective agreement. Obviously,
the potential for employer abuse is lessened substantially in this situa-
tion, and perhaps the national labor policy could be subordinated to rea-
sonable control by the state within its police powers. This decision sug-
gests, however, that powerful employers may petition the legislatures
for relief in those marginal areas where a state interest of sufficient
magnitude might be found. Thus, the most susceptible unions would be
those composed primarily of professional people, whose performance of a
service in direct contact with the public might justify state imposition
of conditions which would have been void had they been negotiated
through individual contracts. It is unlikely, however, that such an ap-
proach would be economically and politically viable for any but the larg-
est employers.
The potential conflict between company policies and the rights of the
employees under the collective agreement was examined in Smith v. Un-
employment Compensation Board of Review.20 Although this decision
essentially concerned the state's unemployment laws, the superior court
held that an express company policy requiring employees to stop working
in the fifth month of pregnancy was a condition of employment which
did not conflict with the collective bargaining agreement and, hence, was
valid.21 The state supreme court subsequently reversed on the grounds
that a collective agreement "could not abrogate any rights which accrue
19. 276 App. Div. 394, 94 N.Y.S.2d 865 (1st Dep't), aff'd, 301 N.Y. 376, 93 N.E.2d 897
(1950).
20. 187 Pa. Super. 560, 146 A.2d 59 (1958), rev'd, 396 Pa. 557, 154 A.2d 492 (1959).
21. The superior court stated:
"A company policy or individual contract expressive of terms and conditions of employ-
ment may be invalid insofar as it may conflict or be inconsistent with a collective bargain-
ing agreement. [Citing Case, 321 U.S. at 335.] But the fact that the collective bargaining
agreement in this case contains no provision concerning pregnancy does not have the effect
of eliminating the company policy in regard thereto from the terms and conditions of em-
ployment. A collective bargaining agreement is not necessarily synonymous with the contract
of employment ...the employment may be validly affected by terms and conditions or
company policies relating to matters not encompassed by the collective bargaining agreement."
187 Pa. Super. at 564, 146 A.2d at 61 (citation omitted).
If the court had based its decision on an implied incorporation of this company policy
into the collective agreement (because the policy was known to the union and Its validity
was not challenged in negotiation), the court's rationale might be consistent with Case.
However, the court's sweeping language concerning the effectiveness of individual contracts
in the vacuum left by collective agreement is at best questionable, if not simply incorrect.
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to an employee from the legislative mandate expressed in the Unem-
ployment Compensation Law."' It is significant, however, that the lower
court apparently was unconcerned about the unilateral imposition of
this term by the employer. It is certainly clear that as this is a condition
of employment, and therefore a mandatory subject of bargaining,3 its
unilateral imposition must be construed as an unfair labor practice.
-2 4
In many instances, state courts have resorted to ingenious arguments
to enforce a particular individual contract, even though a collective
bargaining agreement was in effect. Fava v. Spacarb New York Dis-
tributors, InC.,25 provides an illustration of such logic. There, an em-
ployee had an individual contract of employment for a stated term of
five years, with a provision requiring the arbitration of employer-employee
disputes. The employee was discharged, which discharge the employee
alleged to be wrongful. After this discharge, but before the five-year term
expired, the employer was unionized and a collective bargaining agree-
ment was reached. The employer claimed that this latter agreement super-
seded the individual contract and that, therefore, he was not required
to arbitrate the discharge. The court responded simply that at the
time of the collective agreement the ex-employee was not a member of the
bargaining unit. Hence, as to him, the collective agreement had no force.
This court's position seems consistent with the general policy favoring
arbitration," and with the dictum in Case which left open instances in
which an individual employee could rely on his individual contract with
his employer. 2 However, the court circumvented these policy issues by
holding merely that the bargaining unit was composed only of present
employees--an entirely satisfactory method of reaching an equitable
result.
In Sloan v. Journal Publishing Co., 29 a state court faced a situation
where individuals, on their own initiative-a very important factor in the
court's view-requested that their status as employees be terminated in
favor of a new status as independent contractors with individual con-
22. 396 Pa. at 559, 154 A.2d at 493.
23. The mandatory subjects of bargaining are "wages, hours, and other terms and condi-
tions of employment.. . 2' 29 US.C. § 158(d) (1970).
24. The leading case in this area is NLRB v. Katz, 369 US. 736 (1962).
25. 207 Misc. 846, 139 N.Y.S.2d 866 (Sup. Ct. 1955).
26. Id. at 848, 139 N.Y.S.2d at 867-68.
27. This policy seems best illustrated by the Supreme Court in three cases known as the
"Steelworkers Trilogy": United Steelworkers of America v. American Mg. Co., 363 U.S. 564
(1960); United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navig. Co., 363 U.S. 574
(1960) ; and United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp, 363 U.S. 593
(1960). This topic is discussed further at notes 84-93 infra and accompanying text.
28. See note 10 supra.
29. 213 Ore. 324, 324 P.2d 449 (1958).
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tracts. Plaintiffs were newspaper employees governed by a collective
bargaining agreement negotiated between the employer and the American
Newspaper Guild. They approached the employer with an offer that
they become wholesale newspaper dealers pursuant to the above-men-
tioned individual contracts. The paper agreed and accepted their resig-
nations as employees. At first, the Guild also seemed to accept this change
in status. But this apparent complacency was short-lived. Convinced
that it still retained jurisdiction over the "wholesalers," the union in-
voked the established grievance procedure and won its case before an
arbitration panel. The union then threatened a strike unless the employer
denied effect to the individual contracts signed with plaintiffs. At this
juncture, the plaintiffs filed suit to stop the union's interference with their
contract rights and obtained injunctive relief.
After a careful analysis of the specific factual situation, the court
concluded that the plaintiffs, indeed, were independent contractors, over
which the Guild had no jurisdiction. In other words, the court believed
that there was no conflict with the collective agreement because it was
not applicable to these employees.30
In some instances, courts have been less than sympathetic to indi-
viduals asserting their individual contracts with employers in order to
achieve what would be a clearly inequitable result. Mossberg v. Standard
Oil Co.3 is a case in point. In 1937, plaintiff signed a contract of employ-
ment with defendant, terminable at will upon sixty days' notice, and
which guaranteed a reasonable salary for the life of the contract. In 1945,
a collective bargaining agreement was negotiated with a newly-certified
union having jurisdiction over plaintiff even though he was not a mem-
ber. In 1964, a strike was called (lasting sixteen weeks) in which plain-
tiff joined the picket line and received some form of compensation from
the union. There was only minimal evidence that he sought any work
from his employer during the course of the strike. After the strike
ended, plaintiff demanded his wages for the strike period, claiming that
the employer had failed to furnish him work and that the only way
defendant could discharge or otherwise fail to pay him was by giving
the sixty-day notice agreed upon in the 1937 contract.
As might be expected, the court held8 2 that the collective agreement
superseded the earlier individual contract. In an unusual gesture, how-
ever, that same court refused to say whether the 1937 agreement was dead
30. The court cited Case, inter alia, for the proposition that the collective agreement does
not affect the rights and status of independent contractors. Id. at 352-53, 324 P.2d at 462.
31. 98 N.J. Super. 393, 237 A.2d 508 (1967).
32. Id. at 408, 237 A.2d at 516.
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for all purposes, though the twenty-five-year lapse of time suggested a
mutual intention to abandon it.
The most interesting line of cases in this area concerns the question
of seniority rights. In the typical situation, plaintiffs are a group of dis-
gruntled employees whose seniority rights, established prior to the cer-
tification of a union and the negotiation of a collective agreement, have
been bargained away by the union. In this particularly sensitive area,
there is a great deal of disagreement among the various state courts. How-
ever, in the federal system, courts have followed faithfully the analysis
of the Case decision.
One such case involved the Railway Labor Act.a In Le-wellyn v. Flem-
ing,34 an individual contract with plaintiff, a brakeman, predated the col-
lective bargaining agreement. This individual contract entitled plaintiff,
by virtue of his seniority, to be first in line for a job as conductor-
employment with more status and higher wages. When a union was
certified to represent conductors (and not brakemen), the collective agree-
ment reached provided a new method for selecting conductors. This nec-
essarily and detrimentally changed plaintiff's position. Plaintiff sued claim-
ing that a valuable property right was taken from him without compen-
sation or due process."5
The court held that even though plaintiff was not a member of the
union enjoying the collective bargaining agreement, his individual con-
tract nevertheless was subordinate to that agreement3 Further, it held
that no constitutional right was abridged because any individual contract
involving interstate commerce may be transcended by a subsequent valid
congressional exercise of power under the commerce clause T This case,
however, dealt with an indirect loss to plaintiff, inasmuch as he was not
33. 45 US.C. §§ 151-88 (1970).
34. 154 F.2d 211 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 715 (1946).
35. Id. at 213. Plaintiff maintained that the fifth amendment prohibited any interpre-
tation of the Railway Labor Act which would abrogate his vested contract rights.
36. Id. at 214.
37. Id. Another federal action which seems to follow this line is Goodin v. Clinchfield
R.R., 125 F. Supp. 441 (ED. Tenn. 1954), aft'd, 229 F.2d 578 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 351
U.S. 953 (1956). The case centered on an established company practice, in effect for over 30
years, whereby trainmen and conductors would not be retired, regardless of age, or dis-
charged without cause as long as they were capable of working. Notithstanding this policy,
the newly certified union negotiated a mandatory retirement age of 70. Plaintifls, all of
whom were in the bargaining unit but only one of whom was in the union, sued claiming
interference with implied contract rights (one plaintiff even produced a written agreement to
this effect, but there was no proof that it was authorized). The court indicated that even if a
contract could he implied, the Case decision would require that the collective agreement
supersede. Id. at 449-50. The court also made it clear that accepted practices were dearly
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
deprived of a job he already had, and his seniority, at least with regard
to other brakemen, remained intact. These elements may be very impor-
tant in distinguishing cases decided by state courts.
A state court decision of particular interest is Belanger v. Local 1128,
Street Employes38 [sic]. The controversy involved a change in seniority
rights which had been resolved in an earlier compromise agreement among
all concerned in a seniority dispute. For many years the Superior White
Co. operated streetcar lines. A takeover by the Duluth-Superior Bus Co.
led to replacement of the trams with buses. The operators of the street-
cars, for the most part, became bus drivers. A dispute arose as to whether
the former streetcar operators could count their years in that employ-
ment toward their seniority in the company as bus drivers. In 1937,
after arbitration, a written contract was signed by the company and the
feuding factions of employees. The contract resulted in a compromised
seniority list.
A few years later, the defendant union was certified as the exclusive
bargaining representative. In 1946, during collective bargaining, the union
raised the seniority issue and successfully proposed that the 1937 agree-
ment be abolished. The former tram operators effectively lost the right
to include any of their pre-bus days in calculating their seniority. They
sued, alleging that the union lacked the power to modify the 1937
contract.
The court agreed, not on the narrow ground that special circumstances
merited an exception to the general rule,"' but rather on a notion that
somehow seniority rights in general are worthy of special protection. In
negotiable. Id. at 448. See also ILWU v. Kuntz, 334 F.2d 165 (9th Cir. 1964), where the
court refused to find against a union which, in good faith, stripped certain employees of pre-
ferred seniority rights granted in an earlier collective bargaining agreement.
38. 254 Wis. 344, 36 N.W.2d 414 (1949).
39. The court noted, however, that with respect to the 1937 seniority list, the union
acted "arbitrarily, unfairly, and capriciously," 254 Wis. at 355, 36 N.W.2d at 419, in allow-
ing the majority of the membership (the bus drivers who were not former tram operators)
to change the contract to their own advantage. If the court had placed a greater emphasis on
this element, it might be argued that the court was, in effect, applying the doctrine of fair
representation in order to protect the minority from the potential abuses of their union. For
an examination of this doctrine see Steele v. Louisiana & Nash. R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
However, the court seined to be more impressed with the nature of these rights and of
seniority in general:
"Bargaining for seniority rights is quite different than bargaining for wages, hours, work-
ing conditions, etc. The latter conditions affect the union as a whole and are ever changing.
A collective-bargaining agreement may be necessary and its results are final and binding
under the union's by-laws when the union bargains for benefits for all its members." 254
Wis. at 350, 36 N.W.2d at 417. By its language, the court suggested that seniority rights, at
least those long established, are not within the scope of collective bargaining because of their
continuing nature. This clearly contravenes a well established rule that seniority rights are
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addition, the court found that limiting union freedom to act in this area
would not impair its function as exclusive bargaining agent.40 The court's
reasoning, though it reached an equitable result, seems to go against the
dictates of Case. Nevertheless, the court distinguished the Supreme Court
ruling as dealing solely with litigation between union and employer,
while the case at bar was "wholly within the union." 41 Further, and with
some merit, the court argued that unlike Case, the prior contract in this
action was not adopted to "forestall bargaining or ... limit or condition
the terms of the collective agreement.""-
Belanger seems to be a rare attempt by a state court to allow the just
argument to prevail by permitting an agreement negotiated before union
certification to prevail over the subsequent collective bargaining agree-
ment.!3 However, it might be significant to note that the 1937 seniority
contract was negotiated in a manner strongly suggestive of techniques
used in the collective sphere. The parties gathered, with proper repre-
sentation and in an adversary situation, to settle their differences. The
result was an arbitrated compromise. The flavor of the court's decision
suggests that this elaborate procedure, indicating the importance at-
tached to the list by the various parties, may have swayed the court to
distinguish this factual setting from that in Case. This decision produced
a result different from that expected, given the strong language of Case.
Assuming the employer had been the one to suggest abolition of the 1937
seniority list, thus creating an employer-employee dispute more analogous
to the factual situation in Case, it still would be difficult to believe that
mandatory subjects of bargaining. See, e.g., Industrial Union of Marine Workers v. NLRB,
320 F.2d 615, 620 (3d Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 US. 984 (1964).
40. 254 Wis. at 350, 36 N.W.2d at 417. It is unclear how the court would support this
statement, an effort which was not attempted.
41. Id. at 352, 36 N.W.2d at 418.
42. Id. (citing Case, 321 U.S. at 337).
43. Examples of other, more recent attempts of state courts to employ this approach
when facing conflicting collective and individual contracts can be seen at notes 94-109 infra
and accompanying text.
44. A more typical example is Pietrzykowski v. Safie, 1 Mich. App. 644, 137 N.W2d
734 (1965). There, certain seasonal employees (plaintiffs) of a pickle and pepper packing
plant had individual contracts guaranteeing them that "as long as plant is in operation, thee
will be work for said Employee." Id. at 645, 137 N.W.2d at 734 (emphasis deleted). A subse-
quent collective agreement established a new seniority system which affected the hiring policy
in the employer's seasonal employment, and plaintiffs wound up unable to get their jobs back
for the next season. The court held that the collective agreement completely superseded plain-
tiffs' contracts, and that as long as the employer complied with the union agreement,
plaintiffs were without a cause of action. Id. at 647, 137 N.W.2d at 735. It would seem
that a complete loss of one's job is more important than the mere change in the seniority
list noted in Belanger. However, the Michigan court was persuaded by law and not by
equity.
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the court would have reached a different result. Rather, the court
seemed convinced that what the various employees lost was an important
property right which the union could not change absent some overriding
justification.45
It is clear that since Case was decided, individual contracts have not
fared well when in conflict with a collective bargaining agreement. While it
is interesting academically to examine those exceptions where courts have
found an excuse, often based on an erroneous view of existing law, to
allow the individual agreements to prevail, a simple look at the majority
of cases illustrates the futility of encouraging a client to fight for his rights
as an individual under a separate contract when it will mean a conflict
with the union's negotiated agreement.
Il. THE INDIVIDUAL'S RIGHT TO REFUSE TO HONOR A PICKET LINE
In the entertainment industry and the mass media, where individual
employees are paid hundreds of thousands of dollars and are worth much
more to their employers, the right to force these individuals to honor
pickets lines, whether of the individual's union or of some other labor
organization, becomes a most significant tool. Economically, the concerted
actions of a large group of union members, in the form of strikes, pickets
and boycotts, are intended to give the workers a means of countering
the economic power of their employer. However, when union members of
"star" appeal are utilized in this effort, the actions of these few are often
45. 254 Wis. at 354, 36 N.W.2d at 419. While the Belanger court obviously was sym-
pathetic to the employees' "vested" rights, Simmons v. Union News Co., 341 F.2d 531 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 884 (1965), and Hildreth v. Union News Co., 315 F.2d 548 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 826 (1963), illustrate the approach of a court which is less
sympathetic to such employee rights. Both cases involved different plaintiffs in the same
factual situation. After noting general inefficiency in the operation of a cohpany lunch
counter, the employer and the union together investigated the cause of the situation without
success. As a result of the negotiation between the employer and the union, it was agreed
that five employees (including plaintiffs) on the counter would be laid off as an experiment
to see if conditions improved. After the five employees were replaced, the counter began to
operate efficiently, and the union agreed that the layoff should become permanent. The em-
ployees brought suit against the employer for breach of the collective bargaining agreement
which protected employees individually from discharges without cause. The court in Simmons
responded:
"[W]e held that the collective bargaining power of the union was not exhausted upon
the execution of the collective bargaining contract, that considering the statutory authority
of the union as the bargaining agent, the language of the collective bargaining agreement and
the undisputed . . . good faith bargaining between the union and the [employer], It was
within the authority of the union as bargaining agent to agree with [the employer] that
there was just cause for the discharge and that it was not a breach of the contract by [the
employer]." 341 F.2d at 532.
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much more potent than the combined efforts of their union brethren. And
the economic detriment to such important individuals participating in
such a concerted activity is often significantly beyond that of the ordinary
employee, frequently entailing loses greater than the annual earnings
of the average employee. Thus, by including in the bargaining unit both
major talents and lesser names, the latter, who are much more numerous
and thus control the union, are able to wield power over the former to
an extent probably not envisoned by Congress. Against this background,
it is important to determine the rights of the individual to resist his
union's efforts to force him to honor a picket line. However, the discus-
sion of such interests, stirred up in recent litigation, will be postponed
until later.4" First, the right to control the honoring of a picket line will
be examined in its historical perspective.
A. In General
The most important recent case in this area is NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers
Manufacturing Co.4 7 The dispute in this case centered about an employee
who simply refused to honor his own union's picket line which was estab-
lished as a part of a general strike against the employer. In a narrow 5-4
decision-a margin of questionable safety today given the recent changes
in the Court-the Court refused to find that the union had committed
an unfair labor practice against the mentioned employee by disciplining
him under the union charter and bylaws. Justice Brennan, speaking for
the Court, noted that the proviso in § 8(b) (1) (A) of the NLRA 8
clearly intended that the union's internal affairs, which included disciplin-
ing employees who violated union regulations, were beyond the scope
of that Act. The majority also felt that §§ 101(a) (2) and (5) of the
46. See notes 94-109 infra and accompanying text.
47. 388 US. 175 (1967).
48. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1970) states in pertinent part:
"It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents-(1) to restrain
or coerce (A) employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 157 of this title:
Provided, That this paragraph shall not impair the right of a labor organization to pre-
scribe its own rules with respect to the acquisition or retention of membership therein..."
(italics omitted).
Section 7 of the NIRA, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970) states:
"Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor orga-
nizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage
in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or
protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such activities except
to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a
labor organization as a condition of employment as authorized... " Upon a plain reading
of these sections it is difficult to see how the majority opinion is justified.
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Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (L.M.R.D.A.) 49 gave
the union the power to discipline a union member for failing to obey
the union's lawful directive to honor a picket line without any interfer-
ence with his basic rights. The dissent, represented by Justice Black,
believed that to allow a union to discipline a member for failing to en-
gage in a concerted activity was a violation of §§ 7 and 8(b) (1) (A) of
the NLRA.50
The opinion suggests very strongly that there is a right to picket which
exists until the union, through the collective process, decides to bargain
it away.5 While this decision deals strictly with a union member who re-
fuses to honor the picket lines of his own union, at least one lower court
has ruled that absent a specific ban on such activities under the collective
agreement, a member has the inherent right to honor the picket lines of
other unions.52 Thus, it would seem that the right to honor picket lines
exists even though that right is not specifically granted in the collective
49. Section 101(a) (2) of the L..M.R.D.A., 29 U.S.C. § 411(a) (2) (1970) states:
"Every member of any labor organization shall have the right to meet and assemble freely
with other members; and to express any views, arguments, or opinions; and to express at
meetings of the labor organization his views, upon candidates in an election of the labor
organization or upon any business properly before the meeting, subject to the organization's
established and reasonable rules pertaining to the conduct of meetings: Provided, That
nothing herein shall be construed to impair the right of a labor organization to adopt and
enforce reasonable rules as to the responsibility of every member toward the organization as
an institution and to his refraining from conduct that would interfere with its performance
of its legal or contractual obligations" (italics omitted). The majority seems to have read
the proviso in this section as broad enough to swallow the rule, an unwarranted presumption.
Section 101(a) (5) of the L.M.R.DA., 29 U.S.C. § 411(a) (5) (1970) states:
"No member of any labor organization may be fined, suspended, expelled, or otherwise
disciplined except for nonpayment of dues by such organization or by any officer thereof
unless such member has been (A) served with written specific charges; (B) given a reasonable
time to prepare his defense; (C) afforded a full and fair hearing." The Court drew the
negative inference that since there are controls on disciplining members, any disciplinary
action taken to protect a legitimate union interest will be upheld substantively. It seems that
this is an unfair inference in light of the generic intent of the L.M.R.D.A. to narrow the
range of union activities.
50. 388 U.S. at 199 (Black, J., dissenting) ; see note 48 supra.
51. "Thus only the union may contract the employee's terms and conditions of employ-
ment...; the union may even bargain away his right to strike during the contract term, and
his right to refuse to cross a lawful picket line." 388 U.S. at 180 (footnotes omitted). Note
the negative inference that an employee has a right to picket until the union bargains it away.
52. Kellogg Co. v. NLRB, 457 F.2d 519, 523 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 850 (1972),
dealt with two unions which represented pressmen and millers, respectively. The pressmen's
union struck the employer, and two millers (on their own) refused to cross the picket line.
The court held that the particular no-strike clause in the millers' collective agreement did
not cover the right to cross picket lines, thus allowing the two members to engage in what
was seen as a protected concerted action.
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agreement. However, it is also clear that the collective agreement can
also take away this right. 3
The tenuousness of Allis-Chalmers in the contemporary setting of labor
law is best exemplified by a recent decision by the Burger Court, NLRB
v. Local 1029, Textile Workers,' which held that an employee could
avoid his union's control, even during a strike, simply by resigning55
There is an implication here that even assuming it can survive a direct
attack before the new Court, Allis-Chalmers may be limited to its facts.""
Among the more interesting NLRB decisions in this general area is
American Guild of Variety Artists5 7 The ruling dealt specifically with the
right of the union to order big-name entertainers (and apparently only
these few big names) to honor the picket lines of another striking union.
The American Federation of Musicians called a strike of several casino-
clubs in the Reno-Lake Tahoe area and established the usual picket lines.
The American Guild of Variety Artists (AGVA) sent notices to five of its
members," requesting that they honor said picket line or face disciplinary
action by the union. Two of these featured entertainers were singers, and
thus their performances were music-related. However, the other three
were comedians whose acts were not strictly dependent on music. Each
of these performers had an individual contract, within union-established
limits, with the respective employers, but the issue here did not involve
a conflict between these contracts and the collective bargaining agreement.
The employers filed with the NLRB seeking a cease and desist order
against AGVA on the grounds that the latter was coercing a secondary
boycott illegal under § 8 (b) (4) (ii) (b) of the NLRA.so The board, un-
53. See notes 63-64 infra and accompanying text.
54. 409 U.S. 213 (1972).
55. Basically, the Court ruled that where the union's constitution and bylaws had no
restraints on resignations, members were free to resign from the union and return to work
during a strike. In this particular case, the Court sustained this position even though the
employee at bar had participated in the vote to strike and impose fines on any members
aiding the employer. Once he resigned, the union no longer had power over him. Id. at
217-18. See also id. at 218 (Burger, CJ., concurring).
56. Textile Workers reveals a strong inclination of the Burger Court to read Allis-Chalmers
narrowly. By its action, the new Court has found a loophole which can be used to defeat
the control the Warren Court had granted the union over the individual's right to refuse to
honor a picket line.
The question of a union's right to discipline an employee will be considered in greater
detail at notes 68-81 infra and accompanying text.
57. 176 N.L.R.B. 580 (1969), rev'd sub nom. Harrah's Club v. NLRB, 446 F.2d 471 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 912 (1971).
58. Gaylord and Holiday, Dinah Shore, Tennessee Ernie Ford and Sid Caesar. Id.
59. Section 8(b) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1970) states in relevant part: "It
shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents ... (4) ... (ii) to
threaten, coerce, or restrain any person engaged in commerce ...where in either case an
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persuaded that there had been a secondary boycott, stated instead that the
work of the entertainers in question was so "inextricably involved with
and necessary to the normal operations of the casinos" that their honoring
of the AFM picket line constituted a protected primary activity."0 The
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded, 1 finding
that since the stars were independent contractors, the AGVA directives
violated the NLRA's prohibition of secondary boycotts.
This decision does not deal with the basic question of whether a union
can use the extraordinary leverage of its big-name entertainers to assist
in the efforts of another union. Except for some nebulous fraternal spirit
of unionism, the benefit to AGVA is at best vague and remote. It is quite
unlikely, for economic reasons, that AGVA would ever require the sym-
pathetic assistance of the AFM, since by means of its distinguished mem-
bership it is quite able to control some powerful economic weapons if
necessary. However, even though this issue was not raised, the board's
object thereof is... (B) forcing or requiring any person to cease using, selling, handling,
transporting, or otherwise dealing in the products of any other producer, processor, or manu-
facturer, or to cease doing business with any other person, or forcing or requiring any other
employer to recognize or bargain with a labor organization... unless such labor organization
has been certified as the representative of such employees...: Provided, That nothing con-
tained in this clause (B) shall be construed to make unlawful ... any primary strike or
primary picketing . . ." (italics omitted).
60. 176 N.L.R.B. at 581. The board seized on the words of the above proviso and stated:
"In applying... traditional principles to the present case, it is not and cannot be contended
that [AGVA's] actions called for anything but the refusal of the entertainers to cross the
picket lines of the striking musicians at the clubs in question. The picket lines were established
in furtherance of a primary strike of the employees of the picketed casinos, and the [notices]
advised the stars that AGVA supported the strike and instructed them to honor the picket
line. The conduct of [AGVA] in advising its members to honor the AFM picket lines was
not substantially different from that of the AFM itself in conducting the picketing at the
situs of the disputes, namely at the clubs themselves. Accordingly, we find that AGVA'S
conduct does not fall into the category of illegal secondary activity by virtue of the fact
that it assisted another union in that unions's [sic] labor dispute." Id. at 580-81 (footnote
omitted). In essence, the NLRB believed that the employment of the stars was so intimately
related with the primary operations of the employers involved that it was an inseparable
element of the primary activity of the striking union. The board cited United Steelworkers
of America v. NLRB, 376 U.S. 492 (1964) to support its contention. That case held, inter alia,
that: "The primary strike, which is protected by the proviso [in NLRA § 8(b) (4) (ii) (B)],
is aimed at applying economic pressure by halting the day-to-day operations of the struck
employer.... In light of this traditional goal of primary pressures we think Congress intended
to preserve the right to picket during a strike a gate reserved for employees of neutral
deliverymen furnishing day-to-day service essential to the [employer's] regular operations."
376 U.S. at 499 (footnote omitted). In the AGVA case, the board implied that if a striking
union may picket the employer in the hope of stopping the day-to-day business of the
company, then other union employees should have the basic right to give effect to that intent.
176 N.L.R.B. at 581.
61. 446 F.2d 471, 480, cert. denied, 404 U.S. 912 (1971).
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decision does evidence a tolerant attitude toward such sympathetic con-
certed activity, at least where no secondary boycott is involved.
Collectively, these decisions suggest that, absent an express ban im-
posed by the union, each employee has the inherent right to honor any
picket line without fear of discharge by his employer, and may be re-
quired so to honor if directed by his union. As will be illustrated, this
right to picket takes on greater significance when the conflict is between
an individual and a collective agreement.02
B. The Effect of a No-Strike Clause
There has always been a dispute whether a generic contractual "no-
strike or other stoppage of work" clause can be used to prevent a union's
ordering or an individual employee's honoring of a picket line. The early
Supreme Court reaction seemed to suggest this general language could
be construed to limit such picket-related activities.0 3 Such construction
would seem to be even more favored when there is an alternative method
of communication with the employer, namely, arbitration. 4 Indeed, it has
been almost a rule that such general no-strike provisions be interpreted
to include a proscription against the honoring of picket lines.'
However, like most general rules, there is little room for complacency.
62. See notes 94-109 infra and accompanying text.
63. NLRB v. Rockaway News Supply Co., 345 U.S. 71 (1953), involved a collective
agreement containing a clause barring strikes, lockouts or work stoppages. The Court con-
curred with an arbitration decision finding such language sufficient to discharge an employee
who, completely on his own, refused to cross the picket line of another union which blocked
the entrance of a plant where he was scheduled to make a pick-up. See also Portland Web
Pressmen's Local 17 v. Oregonian Publishing Co., 188 F. Supp. 859 (D. Ore.), afi'd, 286
F.2d 4 (9th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 912 (1961).
64. The most recent example of such a decision is Boys MBkts., Inc. v. Retail Clerks, Local
770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970). However, it is not at all clear what purpose the grievance pro-
cedure might serve where the employee is honoring the picket line of another union, since
the employee does not have a grievance against the employer and is merely in sympathy %%ith
the dispute of another union.
65. See, e.g., Montana-Dakota Utilities Co. v. NLRB, 455 F.2d 1038, 1093 (8th Cir. 1972);
News Union v. NLRB, 393 F.2d 673, 677 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Honeywell, Inc. v. Instrument
Workers, Local 116, 66 L.R.R.M. 2027 (Pa. Ct. C.P. 1966). Honeywell is particularly repre-
sentative of this line of cases. There, one union represented both clerical workers (whose
contract had expired and who were on strike) and maintenance and production employees
(whose existing contract contained a general no-strike clause which included a general pro-
scription of concerted activities). The court interpreted the contract as barring production
workers from honoring the picket lines of the clerical workers and applied injunctive relief
as per state law.
The Montana-Dakota Utilities case provides a good example of how far a court will go to
interpret a no-strike clause to cover an employee's refusal to cross a picket line. The contract
provided that the employer waived any rights he might have to discharge an employee who
insisted on honoring a picket line. The court insisted that the no-strike clause did apply to
FORDIIAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42
In Kellogg Co. v. NLRB, 0 the Sixth Circuit narrowly construed a ban on
sympathy and other forms of strikes contained in the collective agree-
ment, holding that it did not cover the right to honor picket lines. This
case might be analyzed as a quirk, inasmuch as it dealt with contract
terms similar to those used in other cases and construed to have the
opposite effect.8 7 What is particularly disturbing is that this case, decided
as recently as 1972, seems to cast doubt on what was otherwise a fairly
well-accepted view. Certainly, if this decision is generally applied, it will
mean that reliance on other judicial interpretations of such clauses will
cause many employers to be defenseless when faced with employees who
refuse to cross the picket lines of other unions. Previously, it was fairly
safe to assume that a generic ban on work stoppages included such em-
ployee actions, no more specific language being necessary.
C. The Union's Right to Discipline Members Who Violate
the Lawful Picket Lines of Another Union in Defiance of
Their Union's Orders
It is well established that a union may discipline its members for in-
fractions of reasonable union regulations (and reasonably well established
that the union retains such powers with respect to its members who vio-
late picket lines in contravention of a legitimate union mandate). s It is
becoming equally clear that the union's right to discipline is definitely
circumscribed. 9 A union may not impose unreasonable regulations which
contravene public policies,70 nor may it, except in the simple case of fail-
the employee at bar (who honored a picket line) and that the employer could discipline the
employee in any reasonable manner except via discharge.
66. 457 F.2d 519, 526 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 850 (1972). For a brief description
of the facts of this case see note 52 supra and accompanying text.
67. See note 65 supra.
68. For a general discussion of the union's generic right to discipline a member see notes
47-56 supra and accompanying text. In particular, notes 48-49 supra provide quotations
from the relevant statutory materials.
69. See notes 70-71 infra and note 44 supra.
70. In International Ass'n of Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617 (1958), the Court
stated that "the protection of union members ... from arbitrary conduct by unions and
union officers has not been undertaken by federal law [in a pre-L.M.R.D.A. context), and
indeed the assertion of any such power has been expressly denied [the federal courts under
the proviso to § 8(b) (1) (A) of the N.L.R.A.].... Thus, to preclude a state court from
exerting its traditional jurisdiction to determine and enforce the rights of union membership
would in many cases leave an unjustly ousted member without remedy for the restoration
of his important union rights." Id. at 620. The Supreme Court also approved of the California
Supreme Court's treatment of the union's charter and bylaws as a binding contract between
the members and the union. Id. at 618-19. There was also a suggestion that the wrongful
discipline of a member might well be a subject for the state's tort laws. Id. at 621.
A post-L.M.R.DA. (1959) Supreme Court opinion, Scofield v. NLRB, 394 U.S. 423 (1969),
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ure to pay reasonable dues or other such fees, discipline the member
without certain guarantees of due process.71
However, in practice, state courts, particularly in California, have al-
lowed unions a great deal of leeway when dealing with the matter of dis-
cipline of their own members,72 suggesting that perhaps discipline might
be in order even for the member's exercise of free speech if this speech isinimical to the legitimate economic interests of the union.73 Further, courts
held that if a union rule "invades or frustrates an overriding policy of the labor laws the
rule [allowing discipline as articulated in Allis-Chalmers] may not be enforced, even by
fine or expulsion, without violating § 8(b) (1) [of the NLRA]." Id. at 429. In order to
determine whether a union rule frustrates the labor policy, the Court suggested that one
examine the legitimate union interest [which] impairs no policy Congress has embedded
in the labor laws, and [which] is reasonably enforced .... " Id. at 430. The latter vague
standard would seem to be a convenient rubric for a lower court to invalidate a union regula-
tion which that court felt inequitable.
71. Section 101(a) (5) of the L.M.R.D.A., 29 US.C. § 411(a) (5) (1970) which is repro-
duced in full at note 49 supra.
72. This trend is exemplified by DeMille v. American Fed'n of Radio Artists, 31 Cal. 2d
139, 187 P.2d 769 (1947), cert. denied, 333 US. 876 (1948). Pursuant to powers granted in
the union constitution, the AFRA governing board required the payment of one dollar, from
each member, into a fund which was used to defeat a ballot proposition which would have
enacted a right to work law. Plaintiff, a well-known radio personality and motion picture
producer-director, fied suit seeking an injunction against the union assessment, claiming an
abridgement of his right to free speech and the right to vote. He was unable to show any
coercion other than the facts presented above. The court reasoned that the assessment did
not impinge on plaintiff's rights as an individual: "Dues and assessments paid by members
to an association become the property of the association and any severable or individual interest
therein ceases upon such payment." Id. at 149, 187 P.2d at 776. The court expanded on this
logic: "Majority rule necessarily prevails in all constitutional government including our
federal, state, county and municipal bodies, else payment of a tax levied for a duly authorized
and proper objective could be avoided by the mere assertion of beliefs and sentiments opposed
to the accomplishment thereof .... A member of a voluntary association should not be per-
mitted successfully to seek a simila avoidance." Id. at 150, 187 P.2d at 776. The court went
on to treat the failure to pay the assessment as a voluntary suspension from the union. Id.
at 154, 187 P.2d at 779. It viewed the union constitution and bylaws as a contract between
the members and the organization, a position later sanctioned by the Supreme Court in
International Ass'n of Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617 (1958).
73. A case which is disturbing more for what it suggested than for the result is Mitchell
v. International Ass'n of Machinists, 196 Cal. App. 2d 796, 16 Cal. Rptr. 813 (1961), a
decision rendered after the 1959 passage of the L.M.R.D.A., 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1970).
Plaintiff (a union member) backed the enactment of a right to work amendment to the
state constitution and openly and verbally manifested his support. The union expelled him
(but he was allowed to retain his job) for violating the union charter by engaging in behavior
unbecoming to a union member. After weighing the union's economic interest in avoiding
voluntary unionism (and favoring the retention of union shops) against the plaintiffs indi-
vidual right to speak freely on political matters, the court favored the latter, in part bemuse
the economic interests of the former were insufficient. The negative inference is dear: had
the union had sufficient economic interest, it might have been allowed to abridge the free
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have been inclined to accept whatever interpretation the governing board
of a union places on the union charter and bylaws, notwithstanding vague
language (suggesting a potential for abuse).7' There is evidence, however,
that this pro-union trend may be ending. Courts which previously have been
quick to support the ouster of a union member in the name of union dis-
cipline now are finding that membership in the union is a property right
which merits greater protection.7 5
Of particular consequence is a recent decision in a federal district court
in New York holding that persons have the right, under certain circum-
stances, to refuse to join a union where there might be a direct and sub-
stantial chilling effect on that individual's constitutional rights, notably
free speech. That case, Evans v. American Federation of Television and
Radio Artists," addressed the claims of conservative news commentators
William F. Buckley, Jr. and M. Stanton Evans. These plaintiffs main-
tained that a union rule barring any act or statement "prejudicial to the
welfare" of the labor organization (under threat of fine, censure, sus-
pension or expulsion) exerted a chilling effect on their first amendment
rights. After dwelling on the particular nature of plaintiffs' employment
as news commeztators, the court concluded that it would be unconstitu-
tional to read section 8(a) (3) of the NLRA" as allowing a union to
enforce a union shop where such substantial first amendment rights
might be impaired. 78 Thus, plaintiffs were held to have a constitutional
right not to join the defendant union. Among other pressures which the
court found distasteful was the union right to require plaintiffs to honor
picket lines designated by the union. The court ventured into the area
of constitutional law which for some reason is rarely applied to labor
situations.
Evans is at the same time too broad and too narrow. Its narrowness
speech of its membership, a highly suspect position, to describe it in a most favorable light.
An emerging trend seems to counter the above presumptuous opinion. See notes 76-80 infra
and accompanying text.
74. Quoting DeMille v. American Fed'n of Radio Artists, 31 Cal. 2d at 147, 187 P.2d at
775, the court in Musicians' Local 274 v. American Fed'n of Musicians, 329 F. Supp. 1226,
1236 (E.D. Pa. 1971), stated: "'The practical and reasonable construction of the Constitution
and by-laws of a voluntary organization by its governing board is binding on the member-
ship and will be recognized by the courts [and will be denied enforcement only if arbitrary
or unreasonable].'"
75. See, e.g., Berkeley Teachers Ass'n v. Berkeley Fed'n of Teachers, 62 Cal. App. 2d
660, 62 Cal. Rptr. 515 (1967): "Once acquired, membership in a labor organization is a
property right [secured by contract] that courts will protect." Id. at 669, 62 Cal. Rptr. at
521.
76. 354 F. Supp. 823 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
77. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (3) (1970), which accepts closed or union shops.
78. 354 F. Supp. at 847.
79. Id. at 843-44.
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stems from excessive emphasis on the particular nature of plaintiffs' oc-
cupations as commentators and official opinion-givers. If anything, this
suggests a possible denial of equal protection to other employees who
do not have such broad media appeal or to workers who are simply re-
strained from exercising their free speech in general. But Evans is too
broad in that it could have avoided an examination of the constitution-
ality of the statute or its application altogether. Rather, it would seem
more logical for the court to have struck down the union regulation
under the rationale established by the Supreme Court in Scofield v.
NLRB. s° If the Evans court had decided that the union regulation, which
the union admitted it would use if plaintiffs ever spoke against unions,
was simply an impairment of a constitutional policy and must therefore
be denied enforcement, perhaps a more satisfactory result might have
been reached. It is possible that this particular issue will someday be
resolved by the Supreme Court itself.
It is submitted that this growing judicial disenchantment with union
attempts to control individual actions may well result in a more gen-
eralized acceptance of a balancing test wherein the union's interests (in-
cluding alternative means of furthering those interests) will be weighed
against the imposition on the individual member's interests. Thus, it
would be acceptable for a court to hold that a union may not require
employees with a great economic stake in their employment, such as en-
tertainers and network newsmen, to honor the picket lines of other
labor organizations where the interests of the original union are at best
remote or speculative."' In this way, the special cases involving highly
paid workers with union-sanctioned, personal services agreements, for
which Congress probably never envisioned labor organizations, can be
handled in an equitable fashion.
IV. Tim COLLECTrVE DUTY TO ARBITRATE: DoEs IT EXTEND
BEYOND THE CONTRACT TErnS?
The period of an employer's greatest vulnerability follows the expira-
tion of the collective agreement. Even assuming the existence of a no-
strike, no-work stoppage term (coupled with the duty to arbitrate) which
includes not honoring picket lines, once the collective contract has ex-
pired it is arguable that the right to honor picket lines' is revived. In
some instances, the individual employees may still hold continuing per-
80. 394 U.S. 423 (1969), discussed at note 70 supra.
81. This notion has been adopted to some extent in New York. See generally notes 94-109
infra and accompanying text.
82. This of course assumes that one accepts the notion that absent an express agreement
to the contrary, the right to honor a picket line is inherent and absolute. See generally the
discussion at notes 47-52 supra and accompanying text.
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sonal services contracts, affirmed by the union in the earlier collective
period. This practice is common in the entertainment-mass media area.
The problem, then, centers around a union directive that its members
honor the picket lines of other unions during this limbo period."' While
this clearly would be impermissible during the time in which the collective
contract is in effect, does this impermissibility carry forward until either
a new collective agreement takes effect or a strike is called? Does the
fact that a union may go on strike without violating a contract suggest
that it may engage in any concerted activity with equal safety?
At the outset, one must note the extremely strong public policy favor-
ing the arbitration of labor disputes.8 4 The desire to insure labor peace
and stability 5 certainly does not cease merely because of the lapse of a
collective agreement. Thus where a trade agreement provides for arbi-
tration as an alternative to concerted actions, perhaps the benefit of the
doubt should be given in favor of arbitration even if that trade contract
might have expired.
Several decisions have enforced arbitration provisions even though the
contract had expired. The clearest example is where the grievance arose
prior to the expiration of the agreement but was submitted for arbitra-
tion after the contract term ended. In such circumstances, it is fairly
well accepted that the dispute is still arbitrable."'
The more interesting opinions deal with post-collective agreement
grievances. Where certain contract terms clearly were intended to out-
live the collective agreement, it has been held that even though the arbi-
tration (and anti-work stoppage) clauses technically may have terminated,
in fact they are applicable to such special terms.87 In another instance,
83. Recent litigation in New York dealt with this specific issue and is discussed in full
at notes 94-109 infra and accompanying text.
84. E.g., the "Steelworkers Trilogy": United Steelworkers of America v. American Mfg.
Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navig. Co.,
363 U.S. 574 (1960); and United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp.,
363 U.S. 593 (1960). See also text accompanying note 27 supra.
85. See, e.g., Boy's Mkts., Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 249 (1970).
86. Procter & Gamble Ind. Union v. Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co., 312 F.2d 181 (2d
Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 830 (1963) stated: "Grievances which are based upon
conditions arising during the term of the agreement... are arbitrable after that term has
ended." Id. at 186 (emphasis omitted).
87. In United Rubber Workers Local 102 v. Lee Rubber & Tire Corp., 394 F.2d 362 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 835 (1968), the parties (union and employer) agreed in an In-
strument separate from the collective contract that certain health and welfare benefits should
survive the trade agreement. Even though the arbitration clause was contained in the expired
collective document, the court held that it was applicable to a health and welfare dispute
which arose after the lapse of the collective contract.
In Monroe Sander Corp. v. Livingston, 377 F.2d 6 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 831
(1967), the court noted: "[I]nsofar as the union demands arbitration of rights not limited
to the duration of the collective agreement, whether or not the dispute and the demand for
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a court held that a generic agreement to submit all negotiation impasses
to arbitration, though contained in the expired collective contract, still
governed the parties.88 Other cases have held that where custom suggests
that certain rights are continuing ones, and accrue notwithstanding the
end of the collective agreement term, then an expired arbitration clause
is still applicable.8 9
arbitration occurred after the expiration of the agreement is irrelevant." Id. at 10. And later:
"Also, it is clear that parties to a collective agreement may provide for the survival of obli-
gations beyond the term of the agreement." Id. at 11. The court went on to say that
whether circumstances exist such that rights under an expired contract could presently be
arbitrated should be left to the arbitrator. Thus, where there is doubt, a court is best advised
to enjoin a non-strike or non-lockout concerted activity, even if the collective agreement has
expired, pending a decision of the arbitrator.
A non-arbitration case which involved a possible construction extending the life of the
collective agreement is Richardson v. Communications Workers of America, 443 F.2d 974
(8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 818 (1973). A former employee sued his union and
former employer for breach of the collective agreement resulting in his wrongful discharge.
The court reversed the trial court for limiting damages merely to the period of the collective
agreement. It was held that damages were recoverable beyond that period since "[t]o measure
this loss only to the expiration of an existing bargaining agreement fails to take into con-
sideration the realities existing"-that is, the expectancy of continued employment is not
merely contingent on the collective agreement. Id. at 979. Perhaps this perception of existing
"realities" may well be used by courts in other contexts to find that certain collective terms
extend beyond the face of the trade agreement period. This logic permits a court substantial
leeway to limit the activities of either negotiating party during the period of collective
bargaining.
88. See Winston-Salem Printing Pressmen Local 318 v. Piedmont Publishing Co., 393
F.2d 221 (4th Cir. 1968).
89. The following cases provide examples involving either pension rights or vacation pay,
where the court held it to be customary to accrue these and give them effect even after
expiration of the trade agreement: Local 595, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Howe Sound Co.,
350 F.2d 508 (3d Cir. 1965) (holiday and vacation pay); Vallejo v. American R.R., 188
F.2d 513 (1st Cir. 1951) (pension rights) ; In re Public Ledger, Inc., 161 F.2d 762 (3d Cir.
1947) (vacation pay); Local 459, UAW v. Defiance Indus., Inc., 251 F. Supp. 650 (N.D.
Ohio 1966) (pension rights).
In general, where courts have found that a particular term extends beyond the collective
agreement, there has also been a suggestion that this was the parties' intent. In other words,
there are no flat rules for determining where such a result might be anticipated, though
common sense dictates that certain rights which workers have throughout their lives, and
instances where the equities mandate such a result, are likely candidates.
It is equally dear that in some instances, a specific agreement between union and employer
to extend a particular term beyond the time of the agreement will not be given effect. In
Kenin v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 188 F. Supp. 690 (S.D.N.Y. 1960), the American Federa-
tion of Musicians sued to enforce an earlier collective bargaining agreement with Warner
Bros., in which the latter was barred from releasing the soundtracks of films made up to
1958 for use on television without approval from the AFM. The clause in dispute held this
provision applicable during the contract term and thereafter. However, the AFM lost an
election against the Musicians Guild of America and was replaced by that organization as
the exclusive bargaining representative. The suit was filed for employer violations which
occurred after the new union assumed its position. Notwithstanding the express language of
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Perhaps the most interesting situations are those in which the parties
to the collective process intend that until a strike is called or negotiations
are completed, the status quo (as evidenced by the prior collective con-
tract) will be maintained. In Potoker v. Brooklyn Eagle, Inc.,0 the status
quo provision was actually written into the contract. The court had little
trouble deciding that any disputes which involved the "expired" contract
terms were necessarily arbitrable.01 In industries where custom main-
tains the status quo, perhaps this tradition may be implied into the ex-
pired agreement. This construction would be most consistent with the
national policies favoring arbitration in particular 92 and labor peace in
general.9 3
In the mass media-entertainment industry, the above construction
would also prevent a union's demand that stars and other big name
talents honor the picket lines of a second union while the original union
still enjoyed the de facto maintenance of the status quo in all other areas.
Perhaps this is the only equitable result. On the other hand, if the union
is ready to strike-and thereby violate the status quo entirely-perhaps
the equities would reach a different balance and allow the union to de-
mand of its own members that they honor its own picket line.
V. NETWORKS, NEWSMEN AND No-STRIKE CLAUSES:
Brandt9 4 AND Baldwin3
The precedents and historical trends discussed so far in the article came
to a head in two recent New York state court decisions, each involving
the order of a union, after the collective agreement expired, that its mem-
bers honor the picket lines of another union.00 In both cases, the union
was the American Federation of Television and Radio Artists (AFTRA)
and the employer was a leading television network.
the AFM collective agreement, the court held that once the Guild assumed the role of
exclusive bargaining agent, the AFM necessarily lost all of its rights under any collective
bargaining agreement. Id. at 699.
90. 2 N.Y.2d 553, 141 N.E.2d 841, 161 N.Y.S.2d 609 (1957).
91. After the collective bargaining agreement expired, and a strike resulting from an
impasse in negotiations compelled the employer to close down the plant forever, the union
demanded arbitration regarding severance, vacation, etc., pay. The union argued that the
"status quo" provision continued the effect of the expired agreement, and the court agreed.
Id. at 560, 141 N.E.2d at 844, 161 N.Y.S.2d at 613-14.
92. See notes 27 & 84 supra and accompanying text.
93. See note 85 supra and accompanying text.
94. American Broadcasting Co. v. Brandt, 56 Misc. 2d 198, 287 N.Y.S.2d 719 (Sup. Ct.)Q,
aff'd, 30 App. Div. 2d 935, 293 N.Y.S.2d 988 (1st Dep't 1968).
95. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Baldwin, 70 CCH Lab. Cas. V1 13,275 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1972).
96. See notes 94 & 95 supra.
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Performers and newsmen who appear live or on video-tape (or on
film which is presented as a part of a live or video-taped program) are
within the jurisdiction of AFTRA. In essence, the lesser performers and
newsmen accept the minimum terms of the AFTRA agreement with the
respective employer; however, the collective agreement with each net-
work provides that individual contracts, which are bound to the minima
prescribed by the union, may be signed with any member of the AFTRA.
Thus, prominent personalities such as Walter Cronkite, John Chancellor
or Harry Reasoner, all members of AFTRA, basically are bound by their
union-sanctioned personal services contracts which provide for benefits
far in excess of the union scale.
In both Brandt and Baldwin, the collective agreement with the network
had expired (along with a contract term barring work stoppage and re-
quiring arbitration) though the individual contracts with the respective
big-name personalities were in force. In both cases the union directed
that the picket lines of another union"7 be honored.
In Brandt, an oral agreement, allegedly reached"8 with the union dur-
ing contract negotiations following the expiration of the prior trade
agreement, sanctioned the inclusion of anti-work stoppage and arbitration
terms in both the collective agreement to be negotiated and the individual
contracts with the star performers and newsmen. Pursuant to the alleged
oral agreement, the network, the American Broadcasting Company, in-
serted this provision in several such individual contracts. At this point,
and prior to the execution of a new collective agreement, AFTRA directed
that its members honor the picket lines of an engineering union striking
ABC. ABC claimed that members who disobeyed the AFTRA directive
were being subjected to union discipline and were also receiving threats
of physical violence. It sued the union, seeking an injunction against the
AFTRA directive based in particular on the union's tortious interference
with the contract rights ABC had with the star performers and news-
men under the respective personal services contracts negotiated with
union sanction. 9
The first and most important issue addressed by the New York Supreme
Court was that of primary jurisdiction. AFTRA argued that the activities
at bar were protected under sections 7 and 8 of the NLRA1°° and, hence,
97. In Brandt, the National Association of Broadcast Employees and Technicians, the
union which controls the broadcast engineers, was striking ABC. In Baldwin, the Inter-
national Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, a union also controlling broadcast engineers,
was striking CBS.
98. 56 Misc. 2d at 202, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 724. The case was decided on a motion to dis-
miss and thus the merits had not been addressed.
99. Id. at 200, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 721.
100. 29 U.S.C. §§ 157-58 (1970), quoted in part at note 48 supra.
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were within the exclusive ambit of the National Labor Relations Board 0 1
which had refused to take action on an unfair labor practice charge filed
by ABC in connection with the above allegations. ABC argued that there
was a compelling state interest in preventing such tortious conduct, and
that this fell within the exception to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.
The state court agreed with the network's contention. Analogizing the
case at bar to factual situations where the United States Supreme Court
had found exceptions to this doctrine, 2 the lower court reasoned that the
state had a compelling interest in preventing tortious interference with
contract rights, and issued a preliminary injunction pending precise de-
termination of the facts. 03
There is a suggestion of a vicious circularity in the court's reasoning.
If the individual contracts are indeed a part of the collective bargaining
agreement (which may not yet be fully negotiated) then it is difficult to
conceptualize how a union may be found liable for the tortious inter-
ference with its own contract. On the other hand, if the individual con-
tracts are seen as separate and distinct from the collective agreement,
then the doctrine of Case and related decisions would seem to compel
that the individual agreements yield to the collective one. Nevertheless,
the result in Brandt is appealing. Apparently, AFTRA members were
still receiving the benefits of the pre-existing collective contract which
had proscribed such concerted actions, and, if their allegations proved
correct, the union in fact agreed orally not to cause its members to honor
the picket lines of another union. But the decision does not seem well-
based in tort theory. The same result could have been achieved with a
narrower approach in which the union would simply have been enjoined
from breaching its own contract, thus avoiding an exploration into the
tenuous doctrine of primary jurisdiction.104
Where Brandt had left off, Baldwin began. No longer confronted with
101. This is essentially the primary jurisdiction doctrine as described in San Diego
Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
102. See, e.g., Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers Local 114, 383 U.S. 53 (1966) (up-
holding the application of the state's libel laws to publications made during a labor dispute) ;
International Ass'n of Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617 (1958) (holding the wrongful
ouster of a union member was only of peripheral concern of the NLRA, thus allowing state
court to assume jurisdiction); UAW v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634 (1958) (upholding a state
court tort judgment against union because of threats of force preventing an employee from
working during a strike); UAW v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Ed., 351 U.S. 266
(1956) (upholding the application of traditional state criminal laws to a matter which
arguably was an unfair labor practice); United Constr. Workers v. Laburnum Constr. Corp.,
347 U.S. 656 (1954) (upholding state court tort judgment against a union for threats of
violence to company officials).
103. 56 Misc. 2d at 202, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 724.
104. As it is difficult to determine exactly what is sufficient before a state has an overrid-
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deciding the primary jurisdiction issue, the Baldwin court suggested an
entirely new approach to deciding whether or not a union should be
allowed to engage in a stated concerted activity, a test which involves
the balancing of the respective interests involved.
The facts parallel those in Brandt. In Baldwin, the collective agree-
ment had expired, but the previously negotiated personal services con-
tracts which had been negotiated with the network performers and news-
men remained intact. The old agreement had contained a ban on concerted
activities in favor of arbitration; but the union claimed that once
the basic agreement expired, this clause was no longer effective. Because
of this belief, AFTRA ordered its members to respect the picket lines of
another engineering union which was then striking the Columbia Broad-
casting System. CBS sued for an injunction alleging first that the arbi-
tration clause should be construed as extending beyond the expiration
date in order to preserve the status quo, and second that AFTRA was
tortiously interfering with contract rights under the personnel services
agreements.
The court completely dispensed with the arbitration issue, choosing
instead a far more innovative approach.105 Although here, unlike the
situation in Brandt, there were no threats of violence, the court still man-
aged to find an overriding state interest which would permit judicial
control over this situation. 00 The trial judge reasoned that the support
of the striking engineers (by the directive to honor the engineers' picket
line) was not in furtherance of any labor dispute between AFTRA and
CBS. Therefore, it held that the union had interfered with legitimate
ing interest in a situation, perhaps the court should have found another, more solid ground
upon which to base its result.
10l. The court stated: "Nonetheless, one factor remains dear and that is that AFTRA
by its actions has directed its employees not to honor their contracts. Moreover, AFTRA
has done so not in furtherance of any labor dispute between it and CBS or between any of
its members and CBS but, rather, to aid another union." 70 CCH Lab. Cas. at 25,936.
Obviously, the court is balancing the respective interests of the union, its members and the
employer, a refreshing approach in an area of the law where too often a simple black-and-
white rule is applied to extremely delicate questions.
106. "[Tlhe situation here presented is like that before the court in ... Brandt . . . .
although in the instant case there is no allegation of threats and violence. There, as here,
the court found merit to the claim that in like circumstances a direction by one union that
its employees breach their contracts, constituted a legal wrong. In the instant ce, it seems
dear that the possible irreparable injury that would flow to CBS from withholding the in-
junction is far greater than any injury that [the union] might sustain if the injunction is
granted." Id. (italics omitted). It should be noted that in this case and Brandt, there was
substantial opposition to the union directive from the highly-paid newsmen involved, and this
variable may explain much of the sympathy these courts have shown for the employers at
bar.
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contractual relations without any substantial benefit to the immediate
labor dispute.10 7
At first glance, this reasoning is both tenuous and disturbing. It suf-
fers from the same fallacies found in Brandt in that the individual con-
tracts must either be a part of the collective agreement or subservient to
it. It follows that the union conduct was possibly breach of contract, but
certainly not tortious. However, the same basic appeal in the result is
also present. Presumably, the court could have reached the same con-
clusion by finding the arbitration provision applicable beyond the ex-
piration of the collective agreement, and this might have been a more
satisfactory approach.
Yet the route selected by the Baldwin court offers some important in-
sights into the complexities surrounding the individual-contract-versus-
collective-agreement problem. In the first instance, it recognizes that the
union does not have the same interests in engaging in concerted activities
in all situations. It notes that there is a basic, perhaps unresolvable,
dichotomy between the interests of the union as a participating element
in the national spectrum of organized labor and the interests of its mem-
bers as individual workers. Where the potential benefit to the particular
workers in a given bargaining unit is small, there seems to be little reason
to give the union the same leeway it might enjoy when the benefits an-
ticipated are more proximate. This would seem to be the situation in
almost all disputes surrounding the honoring of a picket line of another
union.108 Possible justifications would be that such fraternal sympathies
(1) support a better economic world for all working men and (2) might
result in reciprocal support when the circumstances are reversed. The fact
that the right to honor picket lines may be bargained away'00 suggests
that our courts have found the former argument irrelevant since the labor
laws generically offer this comfort to labor. The second argument evokes
the realm of the extremely speculative, especially if the right to honor
picket lines is sacrificed at the bargaining table.
107. If Brandt could be held to be an exception from the primary jurisdiction doctrine
because there were threats of violence (although Brandt seems to place greater emphasis
simply on preserving the state's interest in preventing tortious interference with contract
rights), then Baldwin would seem to be opening up a new area where the state Interest does
not have to be as compelling If the union's interest is minimal. Here, though no threats of
violence were made, the court still found the state's interest sufficient to allow relief.
108. It should be noted that the only Supreme Court statement in this area, NLRB v.
Allis Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175 (1967), involved a union's right to discipline a union
member who refused to obey a union directive that he honor his own union's picket line.
Since this was a very narrow decision and because the new Court seems to have evidenced
an antagonism to this case, see notes 54-56 supra and accompanying text, it is quite prob-
able that Allis-Chalmers will be limited to its facts.
109. See notes 63-67 supra and accompanying text.
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Baldwin will not be resolved at a higher level. Like most such disputes,
which are necessarily short-lived because of the economic variables at
stake, an injunction decided the case. By the time litigation is completed
in such cases, the strike is over and a collective bargaining agreement has
been reached. In Baldwin, AFTRA simply reacted by withdrawing its
original directive in anticipation of a quick settlement of the engineers'
strike (which then occurred). The issues are important but never seem
to get too far beyond the trial court level.
VI. CoNcLUSIoN
The Supreme Court has never decided the issue of a union's right to
order its members to honor the picket lines of another labor organiza-
tion.11 It has never dealt with individual contracts such as those found
in the mass media-entertainment industry-union-sanctioned personal
services contracts offering benefits very much in excess of the union
minima. The Court has never been faced with the types of conflicting
economic interests which are commonly faced in broadcast and entertain-
ment industry labor relations.
Perhaps the answer lies in a basic recognition that labor policies, as
evidenced by existing laws, simply do not function well in this context.
When Congress enacted the various labor laws,"1' it simply did not en-
vision the exceptional circumstances presented in this strangest of all
possible worlds for labor relations.
But what is the answer to this dilema? Is it the exclusion of such highly
paid personalities from the scope of the labor laws because the labor laws
were designed to protect only those common workers capable of equal
bargaining power with their employers only through collectivism; whereas
here the employees in question are more akin to supervisors?" Maybe
110. See note 108 supra.
Ill. See, e.g., National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-66 (1970).
112. The rights granted under the National Labor Relations Act adhere to employees
and not to supervisors who are defined thus: "The term 'supervisor' means any individual
having authority, in the interest of the employer, to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall,
promote, discharge, assign, reward, or discipline other employees, or responsibility to direct
them, or to adjust their grievances, or effectively to recommend such action, if in connec-
tion with the foregoing the exercise of such authority is not of a merely routine or clerical
nature, but requires the use of independent judgment." Id. § 152(11) (1970).
Perhaps, instead of paralleling the notion of "supervisors," many of these star personal-
ities are in fact supervisors. For example, in many of the network news facilities, a corre-
spondent may also exercise a supervisors role over those in his production unit (including
his cameraman, soundman and perhaps even a writer or associate producer). Similar prob-
lems have arisen in the area of newspaper publishing. In NLRB v. Fullerton Publishing Co.,
283 F.2d 545 (9th Cir. 1960), the court was faced with deciding whether the county editor
was a supervisor within the above-quoted portion of the NLRA on the basis of the follow-
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the solution should rest with a judicial balancing of the particular inter-
ests involved in each factual situation as was done in Baldwin.11
ing facts: "[The county editor] bad complete discretion to determine what county news to
use to fill up his section. He assigned the [two full-time and three part-time] reporters
under him to cover county stories, and he was expected to criticize and advise the reporters
in their work. He spent about half of his working hours editing the copy of the reporters
under him, and the other half he acted as a reporter himself.
"Whenever a county news story appeared to merit a front page spread, [the county
editor] notified (the managing editor] and let him make that decision. But with this ex-
ception, the news that was placed in the county news section was solely [the county editor's]
decision." Id. at 547.
There, the court found that the county editor was indeed a supervisor and could there-
fore be fired for assisting a union which was organizing his employer.
The power and control exerted by many network newsmen, notably the correspondents,
parallels the power and control exerted in this instance. Further, the fact that such network
newsmen also appear on the air would seem to be immaterial, as the editor in this case also
doubled as a reporter without any impairment of his supervisorial status. There may be
questions of estoppel if the network or the individual correspondents decide now to chal-
lenge the respective unions' jurisdiction; however, as the entire area of the law is rife with
complexities, and as the transition from mere reporter to one with supervisoral control is
subtle and gradual, a court's acceptance of such an argument would simply be an avoidance
of the real issues at stake.
For other examples see The Daily Review, Inc., 111 N.L.R.B. 763 (1955) (where a city
editor, in charge of three reporters and having discretion to assign regular and special news
stories, was held to be a supervisor notwithstanding his part-time work as a reporter);
A.S. Abelle Co., 81 N.L.R.B. 82 (1949) (holding assistant city and sports editors to be
supervisors because they had considerable authority to run their respective departments). But
cf. Greensboro News Co., 85 N.L.R.B. 54 (1949) (sports editor was held not to be a super-
visor because there was no showing that he could responsibly control or discipline his only
assistant).
A recent decision at the NLRB regional level suggests a further willingness to afford em-
ployees the right to organize collectively even though they are apparently of a supervisorial
character. In Westinghouse Broadcasting Co., NLRB No. 4-RC-10351 (July 23, 1973), the
regional director determined that the Directors Guild of America (DGA), was a labor orga-
nization within the meaning of the NLRA and that the producer-directors were not man-
agerial employees. Such directors, with independent professional artistic judgment and
artistic control of a production crew, would seem to be fairly typical of the type of manage-
ment employee intended to be exempted from the protection of the NLRA.
However, as the above decision, and perhaps even the very existence of the DGA itself,
reflect, such employees can still find shelter in the right to organize. The regional director in
the Westinghouse case found that the producer-directors exercised authority over other
employees only in artistic matters, not in questions of hiring, firing, wages, grievances or
other supervisorial jobs. This case casts suspicion as to the true meaning of the term "super-
visor," and certainly augurs badly for network correspondents who might seek to be ex-
cluded from a bargaining unit because of supervisorial status.
113. An example of this may be found in the reasoning of the Evans court (discussed in
the text accompanying notes 76-80 supra). The court found in this particular instance that,
because of the threat to free speech, a union simply could not have jurisdiction over a non-
member, television political commentator.
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Whatever approach is selected, it is clear that legislative inaction can
result only in courts' reaching the desired results by means of convoluted
and often erroneous reasoning--efforts which in the process of deciding
one case defile concepts which might have validity in another context.
This article has examined what courts have done in the past, and thus are
likely to do in the future. It has illustrated the shortcomings of most ap-
proaches in this nebulous area of conflicts between individual and collec-
tive contracts. In the narrow area of the union's right to demand that its
members honor the picket lines of another union, a blanket ban on such
power should be enforced because of the remoteness of any possible
benefit to the union so demanding. 14
In the broader area of individual versus collective contracts, exceptions
to the general rules should be made where the purposes of the labor legis-
lation are no longer substantial. In other words, Case should be read so
as to apply only to those workers whose bargaining power depends upon
collectivism. This would not mean that if an individual employee himself
could get somewhat better terms than the group, he must be allowed to
prevail; but, it does mean that if there is an identifiable group of persons,
each of whom has sufficient bargaining power as an individual, then it
should be deemed improper to include these in the same bargaining unit
with those who have such power only collectively.
114. Naturally, this would compel a narrow reading of NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co,
388 U.S. 175 (1967), and produce a result contrary to the holding in Kellogg Co. v.
NLRB, 457 F.2d 519 (6th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 850 (1972), and the spirit of
the board's decision in American Guild of Variety Artists, 176 N.L.R.B. 580 (1969), rev'd
sub nom. Harrah's Club v. NLRB, 446 F.2d 471 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 US. 912 (1971).
